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Construction of some subgroups in black box
groups PGL2(q) and (P)SL2(q)
Alexandre Borovik∗ and S¸u¨kru¨ Yalc¸ınkaya†
Abstract
For the black box groups X encrypting PGL2(q), q odd, we propose
an algorithm constructing a subgroup encrypting Sym
4
and subfield sub-
groups of X. We also present the analogous algorithms for black box
groups encrypting (P)SL2(q).
1 Introduction
It becomes apparent that the groups PSL2(q) and PGL2(q), q odd, play a fun-
damental role in the constructive recognition of black box groups of Lie type of
odd characteristic [6]. This paper provides the fundamentals for the algorithms
presented in [6], that is, we present polynomial time Las Vegas algorithms con-
structing black box subgroups encrypting Sym4 and subfield subgroups of black
box groups encrypting PGL2(q). We also describe the corresponding algorithms
for the black box groups encrypting (P)SL2(q).
In this paper, we use description of PGL2(q) as the semidirect product
PGL2(q) = PSL2(q) ⋊ 〈δ〉 where δ is a diagonal automorphism of PSL2(q) of
order 2. We refer the reader to [10, Chapter XII] or [21, Chapter 3.6] for the
subgroup structure of (P)SL2(q).
A black box groupX is a black box (or an oracle, or a device, or an algorithm)
operating with 0-1 strings of bounded length which encrypt (not necessarily in
a unique way) elements of some finite group G. The functionality of the black
box is specified by the following axioms: the black box
BB1 produces strings encrypting random elements from G;
BB2 computes a string encrypting the product of two group elements given by
strings or a string encrypting the inverse of an element given by a string;
and
BB3 compares whether two strings encrypt the same element in G.
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In this setting we say that black box group X encrypts G.
A typical example is provided by a group G generated in a big matrix group
GLn(p
k) by several matrices g1, . . . , gl. The product replacement algorithm
[9] produces a sample of (almost) independent elements from a distribution on
G which is close to the uniform distribution (see the discussion and further
development in [2, 3, 7, 11, 14, 16, 18, 17, 19]). We can, of course, multiply,
invert, compare matrices. Therefore the computer routines for these operations
together with the sampling of the product replacement algorithm run on the
tuple of generators (g1, . . . , gl) can be viewed as a black box X encrypting the
group G. The group G could be unknown—in which case we are interested in
its isomorphism type—or it could be known, as it happens in a variety of other
black box problems.
Unfortunately, an elementary task of determining the order of a string rep-
resenting a group element involves either integer factorisation or discrete loga-
rithm. Nevertheless black box problems for matrix groups have a feature which
makes them more accessible:
BB4 We are given a global exponent of X , that is, a natural number E such
that it is expected that xE = 1 for all elements x ∈ X while computation
of xE is computationally feasible.
Usually, for a black box group X arising from a subgroup in the ambient
group GLn(p
k), the exponent of GLn(p
k) can be taken for a global exponent of
X .
In this paper, we assume that all our black box groups satisfy as-
sumptions BB1–BB4.
A randomized algorithm is called Las Vegas if it always returns a positive
answer or fails with some probability of error bounded by the user, see [1] for a
discussion of randomized algorithms.
We refer reader to [5] for a more detailed discussion of black box groups and
the nature of the problems in black box group theory.
Our principal result is the following.
Theorem 1.1. Let X be a black box group encrypting PGL2(p
k) where p is a
known odd prime and k is unknown. Then there exists a Las Vegas algorithm
constructing a subgroup encrypting Sym4 and, if p 6= 5, a black box subfield
subgroup PGL2(p).
The running time of the algorithm is O(ξ(log log q+1)+µ(k log log q log q+
log q)), where µ is an upper bound on the time requirement for each group op-
eration in X and ξ is an upper bound on the time requirement, per element, for
the construction of random elements of X.
Corollary 1.2. Let X be a black box group encrypting (P)SL2(p
k) where p is
a known odd prime and k is unknown. Then there exists a Las Vegas algorithm
constructing a subgroup encrypting
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(i) Alt4 or Sym4 when q ≡ ±3 mod 8 or if q ≡ ±1 mod 8, respectively, if X
∼=
PSL2(p
k), and the normalizer N of a quaternion group, if X ∼= SL2(p
k);
and
(ii) if p 6= 5, 7 a subfield subgroup (P)SL2(p).
The running time of the algorithm is O(ξ(log log q + 1) + µ(k log log q log q +
log q)), where µ is an upper bound on the time requirement for each group op-
eration in X and ξ is an upper bound on the time requirement, per element, for
the construction of random elements of X.
Corollary 1.3. Let X be a black box group encrypting PGL2(p
k) or (P)SL2(p
k)
where p is a known odd prime with known k. Then, for any divisor a > 1 of k,
there exists a Las Vegas algorithm constructing a black box subgroup encrypting
a subfield subgroup PGL2(p
a) or (P)SL2(p
a), respectively.
2 Subfield subgroups and Sym4 in PGL2(p
k)
Let G ∼= PGL2(q), q = p
k, p an odd prime. Note that G has two conjugacy
classes of involutions, say ±-type involutions, where the order of the centralizer
of a +-type involution is 2(q − 1) and the order of the centralizer of a −-type
involution is 2(q + 1). Notice that CG(i) = T ⋊ 〈w〉 where T is a torus of order
(q ± 1) and w is an involution inverting T . Throughout the paper, we consider
the involutions of +-type if q ≡ 1 mod 4 and −-type if q ≡ −1 mod 4 so that
the order of the torus T is always divisible by 4; we call them involutions of
right type.
We set 5-tuple
(i, j, x, s, T ) (1)
where i ∈ G is an involution of right type, T < G is the torus in CG(i), j ∈ G
is an involution of right type which inverts T , x ∈ G is an element of order 3
normalising 〈i, j〉 and s ∈ T is an element of order 4. We also set k = ij and
note that k is also of right type. Clearly V = 〈i, j〉 is a Klein 4-subgroup and
〈i, j, x〉 ∼= Alt4. Moreover, we have 〈i, j, x, s〉 ∼= Sym4.
An alternative and slightly easier construction of Sym4 in PGL2(q) is as
follows. Let i, j ∈ G ∼= PGL2(q) be involutions of right type where j inverts
the torus in CG(i), choosing the elements ti, tj of order 4 in the tori in CG(i)
and CG(j), respectively, we have Sym4
∼= 〈tj , tj〉. However, such a construction
of Sym4 in PGL2(q) does not cover the corresponding construction of Alt4 in
PSL2(q) when q ≡ ±3 mod 8, see Remark 2.1 (1). For the sake of completeness,
we follow the setting in (1).
Remark 2.1.
(1) If G ∼= PSL2(q), then G has only one conjugacy classes of involutions
and CG(i) = T ⋊ 〈w〉 where |T | = (q − 1)/2 if q ≡ 1 mod 4, and |T | =
(q+1)/2 if q ≡ −1 mod 4. Therefore T contains element of order 4 if and
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only if q ≡ ±1 mod 8. Thus, we can construct subgroups isomorphic to
Sym4 in G precisely when q ≡ ±1 mod 8. Otherwise, the subgroup Alt4
will be constructed. We shall note here that Alt4 or Sym4 are maximal
subgroups of PSL2(p) if p ≡ ±1 mod 8 or p ≡ ±3 mod 8, respectively [13,
Proposition 4.6.7].
(2) If G ∼= SL2(q), then i, j are pseudo-involutions (whose squares are the
central involution in SL2(q)) and V = 〈i, j〉 is a quaternion group. More-
over, if q ≡ ±3 mod 8 (q ≡ ±1 mod 8, respectively), the subgroup 〈i, j, x〉
(〈i, j, s, x〉, respectively) is NG(V ), where s is an element of order 8 in
CG(i).
The main ingredient of the algorithm in the construction of Sym4 and sub-
field subgroups of G ∼= PGL2(q) is to construct an element x ∈ G of order 3
permuting some mutually commuting involutions i, j, k ∈ G of right type. The
following lemma provides explicit construction of such an element.
Lemma 2.2. Let G ∼= PGL2(q), q odd, i, j, k mutually commuting involutions
of right type. Let g ∈ G be an arbitrary element. Assume that h1 = ij
g has odd
order m1 and set n1 = h
m1+1
2
1 and s = k
gn−1
1 . Assume also that h2 = js has odd
order m2 and set n2 = h
m2+1
2
2 . Then the element x = gn
−1
1 n
−1
2 permutes i, j, k
and x has order 3.
Proof. Observe first that in1 = jg and jn2 = s. Then, since s = kgn
−1
1 , we
have jn2 = kgn
−1
1 . Hence j = kgn
−1
1
n−1
2 = kx. Now, we prove that jx = i.
Since jgn
−1
1 = i, we have jx = jgn
−1
1
n−1
2 = in
−1
2 . We claim that h2 ∈ CG(i),
which implies that n2 ∈ CG(i), so j
x = in
−1
2 = i. Now, since j ∈ CG(i),
h2 = js ∈ CG(i) if and only if s = k
gn−1
1 ∈ CG(i). Recall that i
n1 = jg.
Therefore s ∈ CG(i) if and only if k
g ∈ CG(j
g), equivalently, k ∈ CG(j) and
the claim follows. It is now clear that ix = k since ij = k. It is clear that
x ∈ NG(V ) where V = 〈i, j〉 and x has order 3.
Lemma 2.3. Let G, h1 and h2 be as in Lemma 2.2. Then the probability that
h1 and h2 have odd orders is bounded from below by 1/2− 1/2q.
Proof. We first note that the subgroup 〈i, x〉 ∼= Alt4 is a subgroup of L ≤ G
where L ∼= PSL2(p), so the involutions i, j, k belong to a subgroup isomorphic
to PSL2(q). Therefore it is enough to compute the estimate in H ∼= PSL2(q).
Notice that all involutions in H are conjugate. Therefore the probability that
h1 and h2 have odd orders is the same as the probability of the product of two
random involutions from H to be of odd order.
We denote by a one of these numbers (q ± 1)/2 which is odd and by b the
other one. Then |H | = q(q2 − 1)/2 = 2abq and |CH(i)| = 2b for any involution
i ∈ H . Hence the total number of involutions is
|H |
|CH(i)|
=
2abq
2b
= aq.
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Now we shall compute the number of pairs of involutions (i, j) such that
their product ij belongs to a torus of order a. Let T be a torus of order a. Then
NH(T ) is a dihedral group of order 2a. Therefore the involutions in NH(T ) form
the coset NH(T )\T since a is odd. Hence, for every torus of order a, we have
a2 pairs of involutions whose product belong to T . The number of tori of order
a is |H |/|NH(T )| = 2abq/2a = bq. Hence, there are bqa
2 pairs of involutions
whose product belong to a torus of order a. Thus the desired probability is
bqa2
(aq)2
=
b
q
>
q − 1
2q
=
1
2
−
1
2q
.
For the subfield subgroups isomorphic to PGL2(p
a) of G ∼= PGL2(q), q = p
k,
p an odd prime, we extend our setting in (1) and set 6-tuple
(i, j, x, s, r, T ) (2)
where r ∈ T has order (pa ± 1) where (pa ± 1)/2 is even. Notice that if a is
a divisor of k, then the torus T contains an element r of order (pa ± 1) where
(pa ± 1)/2 is even. The following lemma provides explicit generators of the
subfield subgroups of G.
Lemma 2.4. Let G ∼= PGL2(q), q = p
k for some k > 2 and (i, j, x, s, r, T ) be
as in (2). Then 〈r, x〉 ∼= PGL2(p
a) except when a = 1 and p = 5.
Proof. Let L = 〈i, j, x, s〉 ∼= Sym4
∼= PGL2(3). Observe that L is a subgroup
of some H 6 G where H ∼= PGL2(p). Now assume first that a = 1. Since
r ∈ CG(i), the order of the subgroup T ∩ H is p ± 1. Since T is cyclic, it has
only one subgroup of order p± 1 so r ∈ H . Thus 〈r, x〉 6 H . By the subgroup
structure of PGL2(p), the subgroup L ∼= Sym4 is either a maximal subgroup or
contained in a maximal subgroup of H isomorphic to Sym4 ⋊ 〈δ〉 where δ is a
diagonal automorphism of PSL2(q). Hence, if |r| > 7, or equivalently p > 7, then
we have 〈r, x〉 = H since such a maximal subgroup does not contain elements of
order bigger than 7. As we noted above, if p = 3, then L ∼= Sym4
∼= PGL2(3).
Observe that if a > 1 and a is a divisor of k, then an element r of order
pa ± 1, where (pa ± 1)/2 is even, belongs to a subgroup H ∼= PGL2(p
a) hence
the lemma follows from the same arguments above.
Remark 2.5.
(1) Following the notation of Lemma 2.4, observe that if a = 1 and p = 5,
then |r| = 4 and 〈r, x〉 ∼= Sym4.
(2) If G ∼= PSL2(q), then, there is one more exception in the statement of
Lemma 2.4, that is, a = 1 and p = 7. This extra exception arises from the
fact that the torus T ∩H in the proof of Lemma 2.4 has order (p± 1)/2
and the element r has order 4. Again, we are in the situation that 〈r, x〉 ∼=
Sym4 < PSL2(7).
(3) If G ∼= SL2(q), then, by considering the pseudo-involutions, the same
result in Lemma 2.4 holds with the exceptions a = 1 and p = 5 or 7.
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3 The algorithm
In this section we present an algorithm for the black box group encrypting
PGL2(p
k) and the corresponding algorithm for the groups (P)SL2(p
k) follows
from Remarks 2.1 and 2.5.
In order to cover the algorithm in Corollary 1.3, we assume below that a
divisor a of k is given as an input. Observe that such an input is not needed for
the construction of a subfield subgroup PGL2(p).
Algorithm 3.1. Let X be a black box group isomorphic to PGL2(q), q = p
k, p
an odd prime.
Input: • A set of generators of X.
• The characteristic p of the underlying field.
• An exponent E for X.
• A divisor a of k.
Output: • A black box subgroup encrypting Sym4.
• A black box subgroup encrypting PGL2(p
a) except when a = 1 and
p = 5.
Outline of Algorithm 3.1 (a more detailed description follows below):
1. Find the size of the field q = pk (This step is not needed for Corollary
1.3).
2. Construct an involution i ∈ X of right type from a random element to-
gether with a generator t of the torus T < CX(i) and a Klein 4-group
V = 〈i, j〉 in X where j is an involution of right type.
3. Construct an element x of order 3 in NX(V ).
4. Set s = t|T |/4 and deduce that 〈s, x〉 ∼= Sym4.
5. Set r = t|T |/(p
a±1) where (pa ± 1)/2 is even and deduce that 〈r, x〉 ∼=
PGL2(p
a) except when a = 1 and p = 5.
Now we give a more detailed description of Algorithm 3.1.
Step 1: We compute the size q of the underlying field by Algorithm 5.5 in [22].
Step 2: Let E = 2km where (2,m) = 1. Take an arbitrary element g ∈ X . If
the order of g is even, then the last non-identity element in the following
sequence is an involution
1 6= gm, g2m, g2
2m, . . . , g2
km = 1.
Let i ∈ X be an involution constructed as above. Then, we construct
CX(i) by the method described in [4, 8] together with the result in [20].
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To check whether i is an involution of right type, we construct a random
element g ∈ CX(i) and consider g
q±1. If |g| > 2 and gq+1 6= 1, then i
is of +-type. We follow the analogous process to check whether i is of
−-type. We have CX(i) = T ⋊ 〈w〉 where T is a torus of order q ± 1 and
w is an involution which inverts T . Observe that the coset Tw consists of
involutions inverting T , so half of the elements of CX(i) are the involutions
inverting T and half of the involutions in Tw are of the same type as i. We
check whether j has the same type as i by following the same procedure
above. Let j ∈ CX(i) be such an involution, then, clearly, V = 〈i, j〉 is
a Klein 4-group. For the construction of a generator of T , notice that a
random element of CX(i) is either an involution inverting T or an element
of T and, by [15], the probability of finding a generator of a cyclic group
of order q± 1 is at least O(1/ log log q). Since |T | is divisible by 4, we can
find an element t ∈ CX(i) such that t
2 6= 1 and t|T |/2 6= 1 with probability
at least O(1/ log log q) and such an element is a generator of T .
Step 3: By Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3, we can construct an element x of order 3
normalizing V = 〈i, j〉 with probability at least 1/2− 1/2q.
Step 4: Since the order T is divisible by 4, we set s = t|T |/4 and we can deduce
that 〈s, x〉 ∼= Sym4 from the discussion in the beginning of Section 2.
Step 5: It follows from Lemma 2.4 that the subgroup 〈r, x〉 encrypts a black
box group PGL2(p
a) except when a = 1 and p = 5.
Following the arguments in Remarks 2.1 and 2.5, we have the corresponding
algorithms for the black box groups encrypting (P)SL2(q).
3.1 Complexity
Let µ be an upper bound on the time requirement for each group operation in X
and ξ an upper bound on the time requirement, per element, for the construction
of random elements of X .
We outline the running time of Algorithm 3.1 for each step as presented in
the previous section. For simplicity, we assume that E = |X | = |PGL2(q)| =
q(q2 − 1).
Step 1 First, random elements in X belong to a torus of order q−1 or q+1 with
probability at least 1−O(1/q). Then, in each type of tori, by [15], we can
find an elements of order q−1 and q+1 with probability c/ log log q for some
constant c. Therefore, producingm = O(log log q) elements g1, . . . , gm, we
assume that one of gi has order q−1 and gj has order q+1. Now, checking
each g
p(p2ℓ−1)
i = 1 involves at most log p
2ℓ+1 group operations making the
overall cost to determine the exact power of p involving in q = pk,
k∑
ℓ=1
log(p2ℓ+1) = log pk
2+2k = (k + 2) log q.
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Hence the size of the field can be computed in time O(kµ log log q log q +
ξ log log q).
Step 2 By [12, Corollary 5.3], random elements in X have even order with
probability at least 1/4. Then, construction of an involution i from a ran-
dom element and checking whether an element of the form iig has odd
order for a random element involves constant number of construction of
a random element in X and CX(i) and logE ≤ log q
3 group operations
by repeated square and multiply method. Checking whether an involu-
tion is of desired type involves logE group operations. By [15], we can
find a generator for the torus T ≤ CX(i) with probability O(1/ log log q)
and checking whether it is indeed a generator of T involves log q group
operations. Hence we can construct involutions i, j of desired type and a
generator t of the torus T in time O(ξ(1 + log log q) + µ log log q log q).
Step 3 By Lemma 2.3 the elements h1 = ij
g and h2 = jk
gu−1
1 have odd orders
m1 and m2 with probability 1/2 − 1/2q. Checking both elements for
having odd order and construction of elements h
m1+1
2
1 and h
m2+1
2
2 involves
logE group operations making overall cost O(ξ + µ log q) to construct an
element x of order 3 permuting the involutions i, j, k of right type.
Step 4 The element s can be constructed in time O(µ log q).
Step 5 The element r can be constructed in time O(µ log q).
Combining the running times of the steps above, the overall running time of the
algorithm for the construction of Sym4 and PGL2(p
k) is O(ξ(log log q + 1) +
µ(k log log q log q + log q)).
Observe that the algorithm presented in Section 3 together with Remarks 2.1
and 2.5 and the computation of the complexity above gives a proof of Theorem
1.1 and Corollaries 1.2 and 1.3.
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